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The Steinberg Law Firm Offshore Injury Litigation |
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The Steinberg Law Firm, P.C. 3200 Travis, Suite 300 713-529-0025 |
Free Case Evaluation: E-Mail Mr. Steinberg What is a vessel? The United States Supreme Court has provided little guidance regarding the definition of a vessel for purposes of the Jones Act. While many "Jones Act'" cases and "member of the crew" cases have reached the Supreme Court, the status of the structure was rarely the court's central focus in reaching its conclusion. A few Supreme Court cases have, however, provided an analysis for vessel determination. See In Re: Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903) (wherein curt stated "neither size, form, equipment nor means of propulsion are determinative factors); Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19 (1926) (denying vessel status, the court focused on the purpose of the structure to serve as an office, warehouse and wharf. Court recognized that the structure was not capable of being used as a means of transportation upon water); Gianfala v. The Texas Company, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U.S. 271 (1958); Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. 20 (1961). With regard to oilfield special purpose vessels, the fifth Circuit has on many occasions determined whether vessel status exists. In Offshore Co. v. Robison, supra, the Fifth Circuit held that jackup drilling barges resting on the ocean floor remain a vessel. In Boatel Inc. v. Delamore, 379 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1967), a drilling tender moored in one place is excess of a year as a support facility for a fixed stationary platform was added to the list of special purpose structures that are classified as vessels. In Parks v. Dow Div. Of Dow Chemical Corp., 712 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1983) the plaintiff was a company man for an offshore drilling operation being performed upon a fixed platform, but serviced by a drilling tender. The defendant argued that the tender had become an appurtenance of the fixed platform and thus was no longer in navigation. The court rejected these arguments and affirmed its ruling that a drilling tender is a vessel in navigation. Additionally, in Columb v. Texaco Inc. 736 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1984), the court stuck to its line of cases classifying mobile drilling structures as vessels. However, barges which are immobile for extended periods of time are not vessels. Special purpose floating structures are typically not considered to be vessels. In Hemba v. Freeport McMoran Energy Partners Ltd., 811 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1987) the court determined that a rig which was attached to the bottom of the ocean by pilings driven two hundred feet into the sea bed and which had been moved only twice in a twenty year period prior to plaintiff's injury was not a vessel. The rig had no navigation lights or lifesaving gear nor did it maintain its registration with the Coast Guard as a vessel. Additionally, there were no crews quarters or no galley area upon the rig. In Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1990) the court determined the vessel status of a quarter boat barge. The barge was equipped with living quarters and equipment utilized to service offshore oilfield activities. The barge had been brought to a shore side location approximately six months prior to the plaintiff's injury, spudded down on the seaside, and moored to the bank. The structure was determined to be a non/vessel. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the analysis must focus upon the purpose for which the craft is constructed and the business in which it is engaged. As the vessel did not transport cargo or passengers, was not designed for navigation, nor was it in navigation of the time of the injury, the court determined it was not a vessel. With respect to dry docks and construction platforms, the law is less clear. In Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Marine Enterprises Inc., 877 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1989), the structure in question was a cargo barge that had been converted to a stationary work platform from which repairing and cleaning operations were performed. The barge remained permanently moored to the shores by wires except when it had to be tugged short distances due to the level of the water. Emphasizing the work platform status of the structure in question, the court concluded that it was not a vessel. The fact that the structure was originally a navigable barge was of no moment, since any transportation plat formed in its current status was totally incidental to its primary purpose of serving as a work platform. In Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504 (11th Cir. 1990) the barge in question was a 120 foot spud barge used in connection with the construction of a seawall in Ft. Lauderdale. The barge had only been moved from this location one time for approximately five days during the six month period prior to the plaintiff's injury. It was undisputed that the barge was constructed for the purpose of serving as a work platform. In recognizing that the primary purpose of the barge was to serve as a work platform, the court determined it was not a vessel. In Davis & Sons Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1990) the Fifth Circuit concluded that a spud barge used as a work platform was a vessel. The spud barge had its own motor power and traveled from one job to another within the field in which it worked on almost a daily basis. The barge was considered a special purpose vessel whose transportation function was more than merely incidental to its primary purpose as a work platform. The court recognized that the vessel was in effect a mobile maintenance unit and was both designed for and used as a mode of transportation on navigable waters. With respect to vessels under repair or in storage, Wagonner v. Sealand Service, Inc., 486 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1973) provides a detailed consideration of the criteria for when a vessel has been taken out of navigation as a matter of law. The focus is upon the extent of repair operations and on who controls those operations. A vessel which temporarily leaves commerce, enters a shipyard for minor repairs, and thereupon returns to commerce, remains in navigation. With respect to new vessels under construction, in Richendollar v. Diamond M. Drilling Co. Inc., 819 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit determined that in order for a water born structure to qualify as a "vessel" it must be a vessel for purposes of maritime jurisdiction. The structure in question was a jackup drilling rig. It was eighty-five percent complete at the time of plaintiff's accident but could not yet float on water. In concluding this structure was not a vessel for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, the court expressly overruled a number of its prior panel decisions. In Rosetti v. Avondale Shipyards Inc., 821 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1987) the vessel was an unfinished structure that had already been placed in the water at the time of the plaintiff's injury. The court concluded that the majority of the navigation equipment had not yet been installed, dock trials and sea trials had not taken plane and no crew had been assigned to the vessel. Quoting Richendollar, the court concluded that in order for a structure to be a vessel, it must be capable of navigation or its special purpose use on or in the water. Contact us to discuss your case The Steinberg Law Firm investigates offshore injury claims. Please contact us for a free legal consultation. Please E-Mail Andrew E. Steinberg* at: slawfirm@swbell.net or submit your case here. *Not Certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. |